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Notions of Progress
C. Waite

From the horseless carriage to jet travel, from early struggles to regulate
the airwaves to satellite telecommunications, the twentieth century provided a
wealth of new ways to engage the world. Such progress was not without a price.
The post-modern disenchantment of the late twentieth century was mirrored by
an earlier crisis following the first and second world wars. Whether it was theoretical physicists deciding that God played dice, or Existentialists declaring that
God was dead, our faith in reason, as well as faith itself, was called into question. We began to understand that our attempts to redefine our place in the
world could create unprecedented havoc. Discussions of technological innovation, specifically the social consequences of such technology, often draw on
shared notions of progress. I suggest notion, rather than concept or theory, because the term notion allows for sentiments and assumptions, unlike the terms
concept or theory.
While progress can be addressed in terms of social values, i.e., greater
freedoms, progress has also been associated with science and innovation. If a
machine can improve quality of life or enhance our understanding, by implication the relationship between human and machine is supportive and purposeful. The question of how we are related to our machines will grow more acute in
the twenty-first century. Whereas in the mid-twentieth century people wondered if machines could think, in the twenty-first century the boundaries between human and machine are being investigated in ways that extend beyond
thinking. Based on her experience with virtual reality, N. Katherine Hayles
(1999) writes of the “disorienting, exhilarating effect of the feeling that subjectivity is dispersed throughout the cybernetic circuit” (p. 27). Current innovations
in “nanotechnology, microbiology, virtual reality, artificial life, neurophysiology,
artificial intelligence, and cognitive sciences, among others” promise to alter our
relationship to machines in unprecedented ways (Hayles, p. 247).
The question of progress and a concern with relatedness are elements of
the same puzzle. The very idea of progress, or lack of it, indicates something
about the role machines can play in one’s life. Notions about how technology
can be used – to improve, subvert, destroy, extend, or interrogate – reveal the
interplay of human and machine. I wish to understand the extent to which we
are being not displaced by technology, but realigned. Differing notions of progress may illustrate the nature of that realignment.
Suggesting that technology merely serves our purpose fails to address
the complex interdependence of human and machine. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries the hope was that scientific advances would help us
master the mysteries of the physical world and the conundrums of the social
mileau. Current assumptions about progress, to the extent that such assumptions are evident, do not afford such optimism. What notion of progress might

adequately capture the complex interdependence of human and machine in a
way that illuminates our current predicament? The predicament is that we do
not know where we stand. The optimism of an earlier century can no longer
serve as our guide. That predicament is confounded by speed and scale. Whereas the printing press took centuries to alter social structures, technological innovation now occurs rapidly, altering our perception of both time and scale in
the process. It appears that we are dwarfed by our innovations, which are
daunting in their pervasiveness.
A belief in progress suggests a teleology, or purposeful development toward an end, a progression which is onward, better, and typically bigger.
Though that notion of progress has created its own set of difficulties, past technological developments tended to encourage such optimism. In 1939 David
Sarnoff referred to television as “an art which shines in a troubled world” (as
cited in Goldstein, 1991, p. 58). The hope was that television was “a creative
force which [could] be utilize[d] for the benefit of all mankind” (p.58). Today
many question the benefits of television.
Notions of a grand design which might reveal the progression from past
to future become increasingly problematic as the chaotic and complex nature of
the world is made evident. We have lost faith in such a possibility. Writing in
The History of the Idea of Progress (1979), Robert Nisbet argues that “Only … in
the context of a true culture in which the core is a deep and wide sense of the
sacred are we likely to regain the vital conditions of progress itself and of faith
in progress – past, present, and future” (p. 357). Nisbet suggests that there are
five crucial premises which support the idea of progress:
Belief in the value of the past; conviction of the nobility, even superiority, of
Western civilization; acceptance of the worth of economic and technological
growth; faith in reason and in the kind of scientific knowledge that can come
from reason alone; and, finally, belief in the intrinsic importance, the ineffaceable
worth of life on this earth (p. 317).

Events in the later half of the twentieth century challenged each of these premises in significant ways. Nisbet argues that without these premises “faith in the
once powerful idea of human progress must die altogether” (p. 318). Perhaps
those fundamental premises of an earlier century are now being usurped by
new premises, and by a very different notion of progress?
A world without any concept of progress would seem very strange indeed.
We have not rid ourselves of the desire to think about where we are headed. Do
our machines improve our lot or make our existence more difficult? Can we
predict the consequences of emerging posthuman interfaces? These sorts of
questions seem inescapable. The old assumptions regarding progress surface
again in our explanations. Perhaps there are ways of answering the question of
where we are headed without invoking the notion of a grand design. If teleology
is problematic, we might consider teleonomy instead. As explained by Mark
Taylor in The Moment of Complexity:
As end-directed but not purposeful, teleonomic processes are neither linear nor
circular. On the one hand, system and environment are joined in recursive circuits that create both unexpected and disproportionate changes, and, on the
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other hand, the openness of complex adaptive systems leads to aleatory changes
in schemata that distinguish the point of departure from the point of arrival.
(2001, p. 169)

Here we have an alternative view of what might count as progress. Though the
point of departure is distinguished from the point of arrival, there is no attempt
to project an intentional progression to a desirable goal. Teleonomic processes
are recursive rather than linear, suggesting certain limits with reference to prediction. The adaptive nature of the system usurps intentionality. Writing about
our experience of motion in the twentieth century, Gillo Dorfles suggests that
“often we can succeed in conceiving of life and its ‘products’ only as evolving in
a continuous and persistent becoming” (1965, p. 42). The “openness of complex
adaptive systems” can be understood as “evolving in a continuous and persistent becoming.” The teleonomic view of progress as “end-directed but not purposeful” might suggest that the human perspective has been displaced.
Biologists working on the problems of adaptation and natural selection could
argue instead that we are just beginning to understand our place in the larger
scheme.
All that we can know for sure is that things change. Progress and change
are not synonymous. While current notions of progress may be informed by evolutionary theory, progress remains a social construct rather than a natural law.
Whether a specific change might indicate progress depends less on the specific
change and more on current ideas of better and worse. Everyone can agree that
the word processor introduced a change, but not everyone would agree that this
new way of writing indicated progress. Despite our best-laid plans, some attempts to improve our lot fail dismally, just as other changes produce unexpected benefits.
You and I might engage in a conversation about specific examples of
change drawn from new types of war and science, emerging technologies and
innovations in communication. We could then discuss whether such changes
make things better or worse, but that conversation would take us down the
wrong path, at least for my purposes at this time. To ask whether specific
events make things better or worse does not reveal what guides our notion of
better and worse, what crucial premises, to quote Nisbet, guide our assumptions. Nisbet argues that the idea of progress cannot survive the loss of its crucial premises. Those premises, based on science, reason, and the nobility of
Western civilization, have been called into question. What new premises might
we employ to explain a divergent view of progress, a way of addressing where we
are headed in a world of tumultuous change?
The Loss and Gain:
Let us consider the loss that comes with gain. There are those who look
at technological innovation and see the loss: literacy, reason, faith, or sacred
traditions. Others look at innovation and see the gain: new ways of accessing
information, connectivity, strange logics, or brave new communities. Writing in
The Use and Abuse of Television (1988), J. Mallory Wober refers to challengers
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and champions. He suggests that the champions of television believe that it is
possible to “harness the system for the sake of society” (p. 145). With reference
to television, challengers argue that “its harm outweighs its good” (p. 136). Extending Wober’s use of the terms champion and challenger to a broader discussion of technological innovation, challengers of technology are concerned with
what is lost, while champions tend to focus on what is gained.
Those who value the traditions of the past understand that emerging
technologies will inevitably alter those traditions. They emphasize what may be
lost. The concern is that new technologies threaten many of the fundamental
values of our society. Family, childhood, and privacy come easily to mind. This
perspective is not merely about values. People who are concerned with the loss
of tradition are also concerned with the location of knowledge in our culture.
The argument about great books stands as one example. We have not seen
comparable arguments about the legacy of great television.
Those who value innovation and change over tradition understand that
with the loss comes gain. Perhaps simply more comfortable with change, they
see potential where others see loss. Those who focus on the gain in a world of
instantaneous telecommunications, fiber optic and digital communication, understand that speed and the consequent shifts in scale offer potential for
growth. Innovation results in different ways of organizing information, alternative perspectives, and emergent patterns, as well as new values. In this view the
promise of new forms of knowledge outweigh the loss of tradition, suggesting
that progress may be viewed as “a good inself independent of direction or end”
(Mumford, 1934, p. 184). The ideology of progress surfaces here in so far as
progress is valued for its own sake.
The challengers and champions disagree about what might count as progress. Those who challenge technological innovation fear that such progress
can undermine pivotal traditions. They are interested in preserving the structures of the past for the sake of stability. By contrast, those who champion innovation believe that change can result in new opportunities. They value the
future rather than conserving the past. Either way there is a price. Emphasize
tradition and lose the opportunities created by innovation. Emphasize innovation and lose those very social structures that create stability.
These perspectives are, each in their own way, correct; yet the resulting
dichotomy necessitates a balance between tradition and change. Historically it
has been difficult to establish that balance. The very idea of better and worse, of
loss and gain, supports an understanding of progress that is future-directed.
Notions of progress tend to direct one’s attention to the future rather than the
past. By contrast, the past, as well as the traditions of the past, are viewed as
less effective, less powerful, or less valuable. Of course, it is never quite that
simple. We understand that we pay a price, sometimes a terrible price, for our
innovations. Loss and gain, tradition and innovation, better and worse: these
terms structure the discourse on progress. What other ways of thinking about
progress might transcend such dichotomies?
Progress is a recent notion. In The Idea of Progress (1920), J. B. Bury
suggests that
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It did not occur to Plato or any one else that a perfect order might be attainable
by a long series of changes and adaptations. …Such an order, being an embodiment of reason, could be created only by a deliberate and immediate act of a
planning mind (p. 11).

Bury argues that “the idea of human progress…is based on an interpretation of
history which regards men as slowly advancing – pedetemtim progredientes – in
a definite and desirable direction” (p. 5). We no longer accept “an interpretation
of history which regards men as slowly advancing … in a definite and desirable
direction.” By the middle of the twentieth century, many questioned whether
humans were advancing at all. The wars were simply too costly, hunger, disease
and bigotry too immense. As Mumford states in Technics and Civilization (1934)
“To assume that a later point in time necessarily carries a greater accumulation
of values is to forget the recurrent facts of barbarism and degradation” (p. 184).
Earlier notions of progress are illustrated by “the great chain of being”
which implied a progression from the lowest grade of sentient life to the highest.
In The Language Instinct (1994) Steven Pinker suggests that “Though most educated people profess to believe in Darwin’s theory, what they really believe in is
a modified version of the ancient theological notion of the Great Chain of Being:
that all species are arrayed in a linear hierarchy with humans at the top” (p.
342-343). Pinker refers to a ‘modified version’ of the Great Chain because the
ancient theological notion would place God at the top and humans somewhere
below God. The desire was to identify man’s place in the world, as well as indicating the progression of life forms. According to Arthur O. Lovejoy in The Great
Chain of Being (1978), “It was in the eighteenth century that the conception of
the universe as a Chain of Being, and the principles which underlay this conception – plenitude, continuity, gradation – attained their widest diffusion and
acceptance” ( p. 183) “Next to the word ‘Nature,’ the ‘Great Chain of Being’ was
the sacred phrase of the eighteenth century, playing a part somewhat analogous to that of the blessed word ‘evolution’ in the late nineteenth” (p. 184). Progress could be visibly captured in the Great Chain.
The postmodern response to the idea of progress is negation, silence, absence. The postmodern usurps dichotomies in favor of the implicit, the unspoken, the gap. We grow increasingly interested in locating that which escapes
our categories. In a mad desire for escape, we deny the power of our terms in
order to find a way beyond such structures. The idea of progress is revealed as
a myth. In 1920, long before the infatuation with postmodernism, Bury asks if
progress “must not…too, submit to its own negation of finality?” (p. 352). Bury
argues that “Progress itself suggests that its value as a doctrine is only relative,
corresponding to a certain not very advanced stage of civilisation” (p. 352). Bury
suggests that in the future another equally powerful concept will replace our
notion of progress, a concept which in turn will influence human thought and
emotion. The postmodern denial of progress and Bury’s views on the idea of
progress share a common theme. Both Bury and the postmodern perspective
understand that progress implies an endpoint, a destination, indicating a purposeful rather than random series of events.
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Transcendence or Negation:
Let us consider two specific cases of twentieth century scholars who argued for, and against, progress. I will contrast Piere Teilhard de Chardin’s vision of progress as a cosmic becoming with Baudrillard’s rejection of progress
as a positive force. The differing views of these two scholars provide the necessary counterpoint for yet a third view of progress. The paradox of the twentieth
century was that powerful accomplishments were seemingly matched by equally
confounding disasters. Our belief in progress was checked by the growing
awareness that our best efforts could result in unpredictable consequences. The
views of Teilhard and Baudrillard exemplify those contradictory themes. Teilhard explores the potential promise of technological progress. What Teilhard
recognizes as spiritual promise Baudrillard identifies as postmodern dread.
As a Jesuit priest and paleontologist, Teilhard sought to reconcile faith
and science. He saw in the technological developments of the twentieth century
a great potential for the evolution of the human race. According to Nisbet, Teilhard was convinced that “finally it is upon the idea of progress and faith in progress that mankind, today so divided, must rely and reshape itself” (1979, p.
316). Teilhard believed that humankind was evolving toward greater intensity
and complexity. As explained in Hymn of the Universe (1965), he envisioned “the
plurality of individual acts of reflective consciousness coming together and reinforcing one another in a single unanimous act” (p. 127). He argued that as we
change our environment technologically, we move toward the creation of the
noosphere, a term Teilhard coined to describe that domain of collective thought
that encircles our physical existence:
To say this is simply to say (what is indeed probably enough) that the stuff of the
universe does not achieve its full evolutionary cycle when it achieves consciousness, and that we are therefore moving on towards some new critical point. In
spite of its organic connecting-links, the existence of which is everywhere apparent to us, the biosphere still formed no more than an assemblage of divergent
lines, free at their extremities. Then, thanks to reflective thought and the recoils
it involves, the lines converge and the loose ends meet: the noosphere becomes a
single closed system in which each element individually sees, feels, desires, and
suffers the same things as all the rest together feel them (p. 127).

Teilhard is offering a teleological view of progress, the end prefigured the beginning, like the seed which contains the flower. He argues that “we are like the
leaves and buds of a great tree on which everything appears at its proper time
and place as required and determined by the good of the whole” (p. 93). In his
vision there is order and purpose to the universe.
Teilhard saw the possibility of an evolution based on the “geometric progression” of economic and cultural links: “each man demands his daily ration of
iron, copper and cotton, of electricity, oil and radium, of discoveries of the cinema and of international news” (Teilhard, 1959, p. 245). It is probable that
McLuhan and Walter Ong, were influenced, each in their own way, by
Teildhard’s radical depiction of faith. Ong lived for a time in a Jesuit house with
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Teilhard in France and both would have known Teilhard’s work. Marshall
McLuhan echos Teilhard’s theme in Understanding Media when he asks:
If the work of the city is the remaking or translating of man into a more suitable
form than his nomadic ancestors achieved, then might not our current translation of our entire lives into the spiritual form of information seem to make of the
entire globe, and of the human family, a single consciousness (1994, p. 61)?

In so far as Teilhard’s writings offered a new perspective on the biblical story of
creation, his views were considered highly unorthodox by the Roman Catholic
Church. For our purposes, it is useful to explore Teilhard’s teleology because it
is just such a perspective that is most difficult for us today. Earlier notions of
progress have fallen out of favor, in part, because we find it challenging to believe that there might be a recognizable endpoint. It is ironic that Teilhard was
offering a teleological argument at the very time that others were questioning
whether humans had the wisdom to navigate an increasingly complex social
and political world.
By contrast the postmodern philosopher Jean Baudrillard struggles
against “the terrorism of the code.” According to Mark Taylor in The Moment of
Complexity (2001), Baudrillard suggested that we are caught in the program
which “pre-scribes the course of development in advance in such a way that
what appears to constitute change is actually the unfolding of a code implicit
from the outset” (p. 69). For Baudrillard, innovation and subsequent transformation are inherently problematic. He wishes “to free the real from the codes
that seem to destroy it” (Taylor, p. 69). One thinks of binary codes, genetic
codes and linguistic codes that order and constrain the potential for expression.
Baudrillard understands that the code exemplifies constraint. In “The Structural Law of Value and the Order of Simulacra”, he writes:
In truth, there is nothing left to ground ourselves on. All that is left is theoretical
violence. Speculation to the death, whose only method is the radicalization of all
hypotheses. Even the code and the symbolic are terms of simulation – it must be
possible somehow to retire them, one by one, from discourse (1984, p. 59).

He seeks escape. Progress is a myth: “We all pander to this myth, the alpha and
omega of our modernity, without which the credibility of our social organization
would collapse” (1980, p. 138). Baudrillard sees the opposite of progress in the
development of modern societies: “the social regresses in direct proportion to
the development of its institutions” (p. 139). His work exemplifies a radical rejection of the social code as well as all things identified by that code: communication, meaning, progress. What remains is the fascination that arises with the
negation of such constructions. We are left with an awareness of the ways in
which we are beguiled.
For Teilhard faith dictates that transcendence is the inevitable consequence. For Baudrillard, the future is constrained within the codes that dictate
and obscure the present moment, as well as future possibilities. Escape is the
necessary option. In either case, the future is contained like a seed in the present. The code, syntax, or map contains the possibilities; in one case the possi-
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bility for spiritual awakening, in the other case an inevitable negation. The ideas of both Teildhard and Baudrillard suggested the linear progression to an
endpoint, though they do not agree on what that endpoint will be.
An Alternative Notion of Progress:
Let us give up the idea of a destination because it may no longer offer an
explanation of where we are headed. As long as I know where I stand, as long as
I believe there is a recognizable progression of events, it is possible to speak of
the future as a destination. Such a view of progress privileges the human agenda, even as it suggests that our machines serve to advance that agenda. Consider instead the notion of progress as a teleonomy, of a “system and
environment [are] joined in recursive circuits” of “unexpected and disproportionate changes” (Taylor, p. 169). With this notion of progress, it is not clear
where we stand. We exist as part of an unpredictable system, defined by “unexpected and disproportionate changes.” Though the point of arrival can be distinguished from the point of departure, it is not possible to know in advance either
that we are making progress or that we have arrived. Give up the idea of a destination and several other things are lost as well. It is difficult to discern a linear progression, or to grasp the consequences of our interaction within the
system. We suspect that we are becoming increasingly dependent on our machines, even as we question whether technology undermines human agendas.
Without a linear progression or any sense of a destination, without the
ability to understand the future consequences of our interactions, it seems progress is no longer possible. Perhaps Bury was right that the concept of progress
corresponds to “a certain not very advanced stage of civilisation” (p. 352). Or
perhaps the twenty-first century will be defined by an alternative notion of progress that takes advantage of the unpredictability of open systems. Postmodernism’s contribution was to question those historical premises which supported
an earlier idea of progress. A new notion of progress demands different premises. Such premises arise from an altered sense of scale, emerge from the challenge of understanding of our place in the world. Whether dealing with acid
rain, economic globalization, or the consequences of social hierarchy, we are
forced to confront our interdependence. The sheer flow of information makes it
difficult to avoid this point. We are caught in a magnificent web that is not of
our own design. The human agenda is inevitably called into question. We suspect that we are not in charge, even as we struggle to take charge of forces that
we do not understand.
Technology helps to advance our understanding of the world. In turn we
are confronted with a world that is more complex and convoluted than we might
have imagined. The uncertainly implicit in theoretical physics, the mysteries of
the genetic code, the ambiguities of cultural stereotypes, the power of recursive
processes, all imply consequences we can barely imagine. Meaning cannot be
spelled out in advance, “is not guaranteed by a coherent origin; rather it is
made possible (but not inevitable) by the blind force of evolution finding workable solutions within given parameters” (Hayles, p. 285). Technology increases
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the flow of information. We become aware of the talk of the universe, from sun
dust to cellular growth. The conversations are poetic, scientific, aesthetic, moral. Taylor explains that “As feedback loops become more intricate, the relation
between past and present becomes more complex” (p. 168). He argues that
“Progress in this context is measured by the increase of diversity and, correlatively, the growth in complexity” (p. 169). Bury argues that progress “is a theory
which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future” (p.5). Our
increasing awareness of diversity and complexity make it more challenging to
discern the connections between past and future.
The perspectives of Teilhard and Baudrillard infer a notion of progress
that is perhaps out of step with current experience. Teilhard’s teleology provides
a synthesis of past and future, suggesting grand design. His vision identifies the
gain. Baudrillard’s denial of progress, his rejection of the code, exemplifies the
loss. However, a concern with loss and gain, tradition and innovation, better
and worse – cannot explain a notion of progress that emerges from an unpredictable system, defined by “unexpected and disproportionate changes.” Teilhard’s noosphere cannot be predicted. We cannot know our evolutionary path
in advance. Baudrillard’s denial of the code cannot account for the way in
which progress usurps the code. The code changes, it contains ambiguity, a
kind of randomness “not simply as the lack of pattern but as the creative
ground from which pattern can emerge” (Hayles, p. 286). In the twenty-first
century, a notion of progress that captures current experience must in some
way address randomness, as well as design. The mystery is that each requires
the other. The fundamental premises have shifted.
Human beings can no longer pretend to occupy a privileged position. We
are but part of a larger complex and unpredictable system. We did not design
the system. Despite our fondest dreams, we are not in charge of the system, nor
do we fully understand our place in that system. “The great chain of being”
served for a time to explain our place in the world. The idea of a grand design
captured our fantasies. We wished for a teleological perspective that might offer
a secure vision of our future. A new view of progress emerges in response to our
increasing awareness of complexity and uncertainly. The challenge is to recognize the ways in which we must think differently about both our place in the
world and our future.
Let us carefully examine the ways we think about the future, in order to
discern our place in the present. Explanations of where we are headed cannot
be based on a hierarchical structure. The denial of progress merely clears the
way for alternative notions of progress, notions that might account more successfully for randomness and ambiguity. We are mystified by the varied ways in
which technology usurps, intrudes, and transforms experience. Increasingly our
technology appears to take on a life of its own, performing functions humans
cannot perform, recording and synthesizing information, identifying patterns,
revealing tacit connections between past and future. The concern with whether
computers could think obscured the larger issue of how technological processes
inevitably alter human perception and cognition. Did machines ever simply
serve our purposes? Yes. On a daily basis, our technology can facilitate conver-
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sations as well as dreams. Technology also alters our relationship to the larger
world, challenging our place, changing our agenda, and undermining our faith
in where we are headed. We must think again about past and future, about
what it might mean to make progress in a world defined by randomness, characterized by uncertainty: a world rich with possibilities and shadowed by dread.
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Abstract
The question of progress and a concern with relatedness are elements of the
same puzzle. The very idea of progress, or lack of it, indicates something about
the role machines can play in one’s life. Notions about how technology can be
used – to improve, subvert, destroy, extend, or interrogate – reveal the interplay
of human and machine. What notion of progress might adequately capture the
complex interdependence of human and machine in a way that illuminates our
current predicament? To ask whether specific events make things better or
worse does not reveal what guides our notion of better and worse, what crucial
premises, to quote Robert Nisbet (1979), guide our assumptions. In the twentyfirst century, a notion of progress that captures current experience must in
some way address randomness, as well as design. We must think again about
past and future, about what it might mean to make progress in a world defined
by randomness, characterized by uncertainty: a world rich with possibilities
and shadowed by dread.
(166 words)
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